Preface
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8:03 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Conclusions of the Commission
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38:05 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Conclusions of the Commission, concluded
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22:59 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 1
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38:26 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 2
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45:54 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 3
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17:57 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: Commercial Paper and Repos
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30:09 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: The Savings and Loan Crisis
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18:16 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
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20:26 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Structured Finance
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12:11 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: The Growth of Derivatives
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25:53 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Expansion of Banking Activities
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19:24 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Long-Term Capital Management
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12:00 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Dot-Com Crash
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12:11 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: The Wages of Finance
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13:26 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Financial Sector Growth
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8:47 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Mortgage Securitization
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17:04 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Greater Access to Lending
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6:19 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Subprime Lenders in Turmoil
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5:33 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: The Regulators
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19:20 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Housing, A Powerful Stabilizing Force
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19:39 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Subprime Loans, Buyers Will Pay A Premium
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18:12 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Citigroup: Invited Regulatory Scrutiny
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4:42 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Federal Rules: Intended to Curb Unfair or Abusive Lend…
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12:52 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. States: Long-Standing Position
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4:02 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Community-Lending Pledges: What We Do Is Reaffirm Our …
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10:44 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Bank Capital Standards: "Arbitrage"
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5:45 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 6. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 6
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1:18 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. An Irresistible Profit Opportunity
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10:21 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Mortgages: A Good Loan
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32:56 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Federal Regulators: Immunity from Many State Laws …
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6:49 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Wall Street Was Very Hungry For Our Product
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17:23 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Moody's: Given A Blank Check
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16:09 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Less Competition in th…
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13:09 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 7
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3:24 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 8. The CDO Machine
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7:50 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 8. We Created the Investor
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22:21 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 8. Bear Stearns' Hedge Funds: It Functioned Fine Up Until One Day It Just D…
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10:33 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 8. Citigroup's Liquidity puts: A Potential Conflict of Interest
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10:51 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 8. AIG:Golden Goose for the Entire Street
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10:28 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 8. Goldman Sachs: Multiplied the Effects of the Collapse in Subprime
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17:16 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 8. Moody's: Achieved Through Some Alchemy
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18:33 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 8. SEC: It's Going to be an Awfully Big Mess
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19:27 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 8
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2:55 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Chapter 9. The Bubble, "A Credit-induced Boom"
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15:00 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Mortgage Fraud: Crime-facilitative environments
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22:31 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Disclosure and due diligence: A Quality Control Issue in the Factory
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24:27 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Regulators: markets will always self-correct
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14:56 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Leveraged Loans and Commercial Real Estate: You've Got to Get Up and Dance
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11:08 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Lehman: From Moving to Storage
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7:47 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Two Stark Choices
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11:36 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
2006: Increase Our Penetration into Subprime. 2007: Moving deeper into the cred…
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12:30 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Affordable housing goals: "GSEs cried bloody murder forever." The impact of the…
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17:05 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 9
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1:39 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 10. CDO Managers: "We Are Not A Rent-A-Manager"
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9:52 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 10. Credit Default Swaps: "Dumb Question"
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24:17 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Citigroup: "I Do Not Believe We Were Powerless"
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18:04 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
AIG: "I'm Not Getting Paid Enough to Stand on These Tracks"
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8:42 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Merrill Lynch: "Whatever It Takes"
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12:28 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Regulators: "Are Undue Concentrations of Risk Developing?"
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7:29 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Moody's: "It Was All About Revenue"
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23:34 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 10
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2:20 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 11. The Bust. Delinquencies: "The Turn of the Housing Market"
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29:56 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 11. Rating Downgrades: "Never Before"
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8:04 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 11. CDOs: "Climbing the Wall of Subprime Lending"
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4:50 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 11. Legal Remedies: "On the Basis of the Information"
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10:10 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 11. Losses: "Who Owns Residential Credit Risk?"
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13:22 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Commission Conclusions on Ch. 11
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2:33 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Early 2007: Spreading Subprime Worries
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7:02 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Ch. 12. Goldman: Let's be Aggressive
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13:59 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Bear Stearns's Hedge Funds
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16:01 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Rating Agencies
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4:27 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
AIG: Well Bigger
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7:39 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Commission Conclusions on Ch. 12
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0:56 |
Read by Joanne Turner |
Chapter 13 Summer 2007: Disruptions in Funding Intro
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2:06 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 13 IKB of Germany "Real Money Investors"
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5:42 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 13 Countrywide: "That's our 9/11"
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8:29 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 13 BNP Paribas: "The ringing of the bells"
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4:40 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 13 SIVs: "An Oasis of Calm"
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4:04 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 13 Money funds and other investors: "Drink[ing] from a fire hose"
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6:19 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Commission conclusions on Chapter 13
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1:39 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Chapter 14 Late 2007 to early 2008: Billions in subprime losses (Intro)
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2:42 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 14 Merrill Lynch: "Dawining awareness over the course of the summer"
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11:50 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 14 Citigroup: "That would not in any way have excited my attention"
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22:26 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 14 AIG's dispute with Goldman: "There could never be losses"
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32:30 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 14 Federal Reserve: "The discount window wasn't working"
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7:47 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 14 Monoline Insurers: "We never expected losses"
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9:16 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 14
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1:15 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Chapter 15 March 2008: The fall of Bear Stearns (Intro)
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3:48 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 15 "I requested some forbearance"
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4:06 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 15 "We were suitably skeptical"
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3:56 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 15 "Turn into a death spiral"
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9:15 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 15 "Duty to protect their investors"
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11:06 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 15 "The Government would not permit a higher number"
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4:42 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 15 "It was heading to a black hole"
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2:49 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 15
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1:16 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Chapter 16 March to August 2008: Systemic Risk Concerns (Intro)
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2:38 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 16 The Federal Reserve: "When people got scared"
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8:36 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 16 JP Morgan: "Refusing to unwind...would be unforgiveable"
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5:16 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 16 The Fed and the SEC: "Weak liquidity position"
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7:39 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 16 Derivatives: "Early stages of assessing the potential systemic risk"
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7:12 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 16 Banks: "The markets were really, really dicey"
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26:35 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 16
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1:19 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Chapter 17 September 2008: The takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Intro)
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3:28 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 17 "A good time to buy"
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5:04 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 17 "The only game in town"
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3:30 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 17 "It's a time game...be cool"
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6:38 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 17 "The idea strikes me as perverse"
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3:58 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 17 "It will increase confidence"
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8:45 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 17 "Critical unsafe and unsound practices"
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6:22 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 17 "They went from zero to three with no warning in between"
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7:31 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 17 "The worst-run financial institution"
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3:37 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 17 "Wasn't done at my pay grade"
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1:16 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 17
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2:26 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Chapter 18 September 2008: The bankruptcy of Lehman (Intro)
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4:37 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 18 "Get more conservatively funded"
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7:17 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 18 "This is not sounding good at all"
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3:38 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 18 "Spook the market"
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11:07 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 18 "Imagination hat"
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8:19 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 18 "Heads of family"
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3:38 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 18 "Tell those sons of bitches to unwind"
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3:20 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 18 "This doesn't seem like it is going to end pretty"
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8:02 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 18 "The only alternative was that Lehman had to fail"
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3:48 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 18 "A calamity"
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12:42 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 18
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2:30 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Chapter 19 September 2008: The bailout of AIG (Intro)
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5:14 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 19 "Current liquidity position is precarious"
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6:56 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 19 "Spillover effect"
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10:50 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 19 "Like a gnat on an elephant"
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5:18 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 19
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3:07 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Chapter 20 Crisis and Panic (Intro)
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7:45 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 20 Money market funds: "Dealers weren't even picking up their phones"
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10:36 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 20 Morgan Stanley: "Now we're the next in line"
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13:07 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 20 Over-the-counter derivatives "A grinding halt"
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6:26 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 20 Washington Mutual "It's yours"
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4:16 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 20 Wachovia "At the front end of teh dominoes as other dominoes fell"
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18:26 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 20 TARP "Comprehensive approach"
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18:03 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 20 AIG "We needed to stop the sucking chest wound in this patient"
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10:19 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 20 Citigroup "Let the world know we will not pull a Lehman"
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11:15 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 20 Bank of America "A shotgun wedding"
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13:17 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 20
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2:45 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Chapter 21 The Economic Fallout (Intro)
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4:17 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 21 Households "I'm not eating, I'm not sleeping"
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12:15 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 21 Businesses "Squirrels storing nuts"
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9:54 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 21 Commercial real estate: "Nothing's moving"
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5:09 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 21 Government: "State struggled to close shortfalls"
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8:06 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 21 The financial sector: "Almost triple the level of three years earlier"
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3:18 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Ch 22 Foreclosures on the rise: "Hard to talk about any recovery"
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6:39 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 22 Initiatives to stem foreclosures "Persistently disregard"
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6:37 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 22 Flaws in the process: "Speculation and worst-case scenarios"
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5:39 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Ch 22 Neighborhood effects: "I'm not leaving"
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5:26 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 22
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1:01 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Intro
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1:19 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - How our ap…
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7:09 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Stages of …
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2:26 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The ten es…
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6:10 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The credit…
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8:30 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The housin…
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8:35 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Turning ba…
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7:28 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Big bank b…
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9:32 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Two types …
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13:52 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The shock …
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6:39 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The system…
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3:50 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Intro
|
23:30 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Summary
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7:41 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 1. Government poli…
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15:59 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 2. The great housi…
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13:03 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 3. Delinquency rat…
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4:20 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 4. The origin and …
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7:58 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 5. What was known …
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17:17 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 6. Conclusion
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4:40 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million…
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3:26 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million…
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3:21 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million…
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34:12 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US govern…
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9:00 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US govern…
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7:34 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US govern…
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35:58 |
Read by Cbteddy |
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US govern…
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27:41 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US govern…
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28:32 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US govern…
|
10:15 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US govern…
|
5:10 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US govern…
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22:13 |
Read by Mario Pineda |
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - IV. Conclusion
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2:37 |
Read by Mario Pineda |